A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability was discovered in the CoreDNS DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) server implementation. The server previously created a new goroutine for every incoming QUIC stream without imposing any limits on the number of concurrent streams or goroutines. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could open a large number of streams, leading to uncontrolled memory consumption and eventually causing an Out Of Memory (OOM) crash — especially in containerized or memory-constrained environments.
server_quic.go
This issue affects deployments with quic://
enabled in the Corefile. A single attacker can cause the CoreDNS instance to become unresponsive using minimal bandwidth and CPU.
The patch introduces two key mitigation mechanisms:
max_streams
: Caps the number of concurrent QUIC streams per connection. Default: 256
.worker_pool_size
: Introduces a server-wide, bounded worker pool to process incoming streams. Default: 1024
.This eliminates the 1:1 stream-to-goroutine model and ensures that CoreDNS remains resilient under high concurrency. The new configuration options are exposed through the quic
Corefile block:
quic {
max_streams 256
worker_pool_size 1024
}
These defaults are generous and aligned with typical DNS-over-QUIC client behavior.
If you're unable to upgrade immediately, you can:
- Disable QUIC support by removing or commenting out the quic://
block in your Corefile
- Use container runtime resource limits to detect and isolate excessive memory usage
- Monitor QUIC connection patterns and alert on anomalies
Thanks to @thevilledev for disclovering this vulnerability and contributing a high-quality fix.
Please consult our security guide for more information regarding our security process.
{ "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-06T18:15:35Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-770" ], "severity": "HIGH", "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-06T21:27:27Z" }