Some specifically configured Spin applications that use self requests without a specified URL authority can be induced to make requests to arbitrary hosts via the Host HTTP header.
If an application's manifest contains a component with configuration such as
allowed_outbound_hosts = ["http://self", "https://self"]
and code such as
let res: Response = spin_sdk::http::send(
Request::new(Method::Get, "/") // Note: the request URI does not contain a URL authority
).await?;
Then that application can be induced to send an outgoing request to another host (leading the app to process the response assuming it comes from another component in the same application). This can be induced with a request such as
curl -H"Host: google.com:80" localhost:3000 # Assuming the application is served on localhost:3000
Note: If using a SDK that does not use
wasi:http/outgoing-handler, the port can be omitted from the URL.
The following conditions need to be met for an application to be vulnerable:
Host header, and leaves the Host header set to the original value by the client.allowed_outbound_hosts list containing "self".If all of these conditions apply, then Spin will use the inbound request's Host header to determine the authority part of the URL if none is explicitly provided in the request's URL.
Fermyon's Fermyon Cloud serverless product and applications hosted on it are known not to be vulnerable.
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? Spin version 2.4.3 is being released with this advisory going public.
For deployments of Spin, a workaround is to ensure that the Host header is sanitized to match the application a request is routed to.
For individual applications, multiple workarounds exist:
Host headerallowed_outbound_hosts list instead of self{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-08T17:50:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-08T15:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
}