The shell environment fallback path could invoke an attacker-controlled shell when SHELL was inherited from an untrusted host environment. In affected builds, shell-env loading used $SHELL -l -c 'env -0' without validating that SHELL points to a trusted executable.
In threat-model terms, this requires local environment compromise or untrusted startup environment injection first; it is not a remote pre-auth path. The hardening patch validates SHELL as an absolute normalized executable, prefers /etc/shells, applies trusted-prefix fallback checks, and falls back safely to /bin/sh when validation fails. The dangerous env-var policy now also blocks SHELL overrides.
openclaw (npm)<= 2026.2.21-22026.2.21-2>= 2026.2.2225e89cc86338ef475d26be043aa541dfdb95e52aThe advisory pre-sets patched_versions to the planned next release (2026.2.22). After that npm release is published, maintainers can publish this advisory without further version-field edits.
OpenClaw thanks @athuljayaram for reporting.
{
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T19:52:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:38Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-426",
"CWE-78"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true
}