CRLF injection in hackney's WebSocket upgrade request builder (src/hackney_ws.erl). init/1 copies the host, path, headers, and protocols options from the caller-supplied opts map verbatim into #ws_data{}, and do_handshake/1 splices them directly into the raw HTTP/1.1 upgrade request by binary concatenation with no \r\n or \0 stripping. A caller that passes any of these fields from untrusted input can inject arbitrary header lines into the outbound upgrade request.
do_handshake/1 builds the upgrade request at several concatenation sites:
Host: <host>:<port>\r\n., and appended as a header line.{Name, Value} tuples are concatenated as Name: Value\r\n with no sanitization of either component.GET <path> HTTP/1.1\r\n request line.None of these sites reject \r, \n, or \0. A header value like <<"benign\r\nAuthorization: Bearer token">> produces two distinct header lines on the wire. A path with an embedded \r\n rewrites the request line itself.
:hackney_ws.start_link/1 with headers: [{"X-User", "v\r\nAuthorization: Bearer attacker"}].Authorization: Bearer attacker line that the upstream WebSocket server parses as a legitimate header.Header injection / request smuggling in outbound WebSocket upgrades. Affects hackney 2.0.0 through 4.0.0 wherever host, path, headers, or protocols options are populated from network or user input. Consequences include forging authentication headers toward the upstream server, log and cache poisoning, and request smuggling through intermediary proxies. CVSS v4.0: 6.9 (MEDIUM).
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T21:59:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-25T15:16:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}