The SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go makes an unvalidated
http.Get() call to payload.UnsubscribeURL without any URL restriction. Because UnsubscribeURL is intentionally
excluded from the BuildSignature() signed field list, an attacker can replace this field in a legitimately
AWS-signed message with an arbitrary internal URL, bypassing the VerifyPayload() signature check entirely and
triggering a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against internal infrastructure — including the EC2 Instance Metadata
Service (IMDS) at 169.254.169.254.
This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. An attacker with a Hatchet account and an AWS Free Tier account can:
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:34:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T16:17:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}