GHSA-fvmw-cj7j-j39q

Summary
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro when using the @astrojs/cloudflare adapter with output: 'server'. The built-in image optimization endpoint (/_image) uses isRemoteAllowed() from Astro’s internal helpers, which unconditionally allows data: URLs. When the endpoint receives a valid data: URL pointing to a malicious SVG containing JavaScript, and the Cloudflare-specific implementation performs a 302 redirect back to the original data: URL, the browser directly executes the embedded JavaScript. This completely bypasses any domain allow-listing (image.domains / image.remotePatterns) and typical Content Security Policy mitigations.

Affected Versions
- @astrojs/cloudflare ≤ 12.6.10 (and likely all previous versions)
- Astro ≥ 4.x when used with output: 'server' and the Cloudflare adapter

Root Cause – Vulnerable Code
File: node_modules/@astrojs/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts

export function isRemoteAllowed(src: string, ...): boolean {
  if (!URL.canParse(src)) {
    return false;
  }
  const url = new URL(src);

  // Data URLs are always allowed 
  if (url.protocol === 'data:') {
    return true;
  }

  // Non-http(s) protocols are never allowed
  if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)) {
    return false;
  }
  // ... further http/https allow-list checks
}

In the Cloudflare adapter, the /_image endpoint contains logic similar to:

    const href = ctx.url.searchParams.get('href');
    if (!href) {
        // return error 
    }

    if (isRemotePath(href)) {
        if (isRemoteAllowed(href, imageConfig) === false) {
            // return error
        } else {
            //redirect to return the image 
            return Response.redirect(href, 302);
        }
    }

Because data: URLs are considered “allowed”, a request such as:
https://example.com/_image?href=... (base64-encoded malicious SVG)

triggers a 302 redirect directly to the data: URL, causing the browser to render and execute the malicious JavaScript inside the SVG.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

1. Create a minimal Astro project with Cloudflare adapter (output: 'server').
2. Deploy to Cloudflare Pages or Workers.

3. Request the image endpoint with the following payload:

   https://yoursite.com/_image?href=
   

   (Base64 decodes to: <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert('zomasec')</script></svg>)

4. The endpoint returns a 302 redirect to the data: URL → browser executes the <script> → alert() fires.

Impact
- Reflected/Strored XSS (depending on application usage)
- Session hijacking (access to cookies, localStorage, etc.)
- Account takeover when combined with CSRF
- Data exfiltration to attacker-controlled servers
- Bypasses image.domains / image.remotePatterns configuration entirely

Safe vs Vulnerable Behavior
Other Astro adapters (Node, Vercel, etc.) typically proxy and rasterize SVGs, stripping JavaScript. The Cloudflare adapter currently redirects to remote resources (including data: URLs), making it uniquely vulnerable.

References
- Vulnerable function: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/main/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts
- Similar data: URL bypass in WordPress: CVE-2025-2575