In openclaw versions prior to 2026.2.13, OpenClaw logged certain WebSocket request headers (including Origin and User-Agent) without neutralization or length limits on the "closed before connect" path.
If an unauthenticated client can reach the gateway and send crafted header values, those values may be written into core logs. Under workflows where logs are later read or interpreted by an LLM (for example via AI-assisted debugging), this can increase the risk of indirect prompt injection (log poisoning).
openclaw (npm)<= 2026.2.12>= 2026.2.13src/gateway/server/ws-connection.tsThis issue is primarily an indirect prompt injection risk and depends on downstream log consumption behavior. If you do not feed logs into an LLM or other automation, impact is limited.
Header values written to gateway logs are now sanitized and truncated (including removal of control/format characters and length limiting).
d637a263505448bf4505b85535babbfaacedbaac, e84318e4bcdc948d92e57fda1eb763a65e1774f0 (PR #15592)openclaw@2026.2.13 or later.Thanks @pkerkhofs for reporting.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-117"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:31:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
}