The GHSA-6c99-87fr-6q7r fix wrapped WebAuthn authenticator deserialization in an ObjectInputFilter meant to allow only AuthenticatorImpl, but it short-circuits to ALLOWED for any object at stream depth > 1. Because the Java serialization filter is consulted for every class in the graph (and depth == 1 only for the root's concrete class), the allowlist constrains only the root and leaves the entire nested graph unchecked.
An attacker can craft a stream rooted at AuthenticatorImpl with an arbitrary gadget chain nested inside. The gadget's readObject/readResolve executes during readObject() — before the cast and before any assertion verification — enabling remote code execution when a gadget is on the classpath. The deserialization sink is reached pre-authentication via an attacker-chosen userHandle.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:08:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
}