GRPC.Codec.Erlpack.decode/2 calls :erlang.binary_to_term/1 directly on the raw gRPC message body without the :safe option. Any unauthenticated peer that can reach a gRPC endpoint with Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack can crash the entire BEAM node via atom table exhaustion or, if a decoded fun term flows into a call site that invokes it, achieve remote code execution inside the server process.
Root cause — lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.ex implements decode/2 as a bare :erlang.binary_to_term(binary) call with no :safe flag, no size limit, and no type validation. This has two independent exploitation paths:
1. DoS via atom exhaustion — BEAM atoms are never garbage-collected and the global atom table is bounded (~1,048,576 entries). A crafted payload encoding large numbers of fresh atoms saturates the table and crashes the entire VM, taking down all applications on the node.
2. RCE via fun materialization — Without :safe, binary_to_term/1 reconstructs fun and external-fun terms from wire data. If the decoded value reaches any call site that applies it (e.g. Enum.map, Task.async, direct invocation), attacker-controlled code executes inside the server process.
Configuration requirement: GRPC.Codec.Erlpack is not registered by default and must be explicitly added to the server's codecs option.
codecs: [GRPC.Codec.Erlpack].Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack and a body of :erlang.term_to_binary(fn -> <malicious_code> end).decode/2 materializes the fun; any downstream call site that invokes the decoded value executes the attacker's code.Affects grpc ≥ 0.4.0. Any server that explicitly registers GRPC.Codec.Erlpack is vulnerable to unauthenticated node-level DoS and potentially RCE.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T18:09:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-15T23:16:45Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
}