All versions of mckenziearts/livewire-markdown-editor prior to v1.3 contain a critical arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the MarkdownEditor::updatedAttachments() Livewire handler. The handler calls $file->store() with no server-side validation of MIME type, extension, or file content.
Any authenticated user with access to a page embedding <livewire:markdown-editor> can upload files of any type (.html, .svg, .js, .php, .exe, etc.) to the disk configured by livewire-markdown-editor.disk. When that disk is a public cloud bucket (S3, DigitalOcean Spaces, Cloudflare R2, Scaleway Object Storage — the common configuration when FILESYSTEM_DISK points to such a disk), uploaded files are served publicly with a guessed Content-Type header.
The consequences include:
.html or .svg filesgetClientOriginalName() value was inserted verbatim into the markdown)A real-world exploitation of this vulnerability was observed in production on a community platform using this package.
Upgrade to v1.3 or later.
If developers cannot upgrade immediately, disable the upload UI on every instance of the editor by passing :show-upload="false":
<livewire:markdown-editor wire:model="content" :show-upload="false" />
This hides the file input and prevents the vulnerable code path from being reached.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-434",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T22:11:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
}