When decompressing a payload made up of many concatenated compressed members (gzip, deflate or zstd), each member was decoded by passing the entire remaining input to a new decompressor, resulting in quadratic CPU time. Empty members produce no output, so client_max_size and output backpressure did not limit the work.
An attacker could block the event loop of a server with a specially crafted compressed request body or WebSocket message. A malicious server could do the same to a client.
Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/d925a80539ffd227da1d93ab4a5bff123cc777db
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-16T14:51:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-13T21:17:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}