CoreDNS' transfer plugin can select the wrong ACL stanza when both a parent zone and a more-specific subzone are configured. A permissive parent-zone transfer rule can override a restrictive subzone rule (name-dependent), allowing an unauthorized client to perform AXFR/IXFR for the subzone and retrieve its zone contents.
In plugin/transfer/transfer.go, stanza selection is implemented by longestMatch(), which is documented as "longest zone match wins", but it actually chooses the winner via a lexicographic string comparison: - zone := "" // longest zone match wins (plugin/transfer/transfer.go) - if z > zone { zone = z; x = xfr } (plugin/transfer/transfer.go)
So, a parent zone like example.org. can beat a child zone like a.example.org. purely due to lexicographic ordering ("example.org." > "a.example.org."), even though the child zone is the longer/more specific suffix match. The bypass is data-dependent (some child labels will win, some will lose), making it operationally non-intuitive.
*** Candidate (add permissive parent transfer rule) *** axfr a.example.org.: rcode=0 ancount=5 (expected NOERROR=0 with ancount>0)
*** OK *** Subzone transfer ACL bypass reproduced: adding a permissive parent-zone stanza can override a stricter child-zone stanza due to lexicographic zone selection.
Unauthorized zone transfer can expose full zone contents to a remote network client that was intended to be denied by a subzone-specific transfer policy.
{
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T20:16:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-28T22:44:39Z"
}