PraisonAI's MCP HTTP-stream server authenticates requests only when an API key is configured; the CLI defaults --api-key to None, so praisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream exposes the full MCP surface unauthenticated. A request with no Authorization (and no Origin) can initialize and tools/list (~50 tools), and the dispatcher forwards tool-call arguments to handlers without validating them against the advertised inputSchema. Runtime-confirmed for unauthenticated initialize/tools/list and the dispatcher schema-bypass. This is not an RCE/file-read in 4.6.63 — workflow.run/workflow.run_file are runtime-refuted (adapter regression). Severity Medium–High.
praisonai 4.6.63. Files: src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py, mcp_server/cli.py, mcp_server/server.py (dispatcher).Path:
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py
Function:
mcp_post / _validate_origin
Snippet:
if self.api_key: # auth applied ONLY when api_key is set
auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
if not auth_header.startswith("Bearer ") or auth_header[7:] != self.api_key:
return JSONResponse({"error": "Unauthorized"}, status_code=401)
# _validate_origin: returns True when the Origin header is absent
Issue: with api_key=None, no auth check runs; a missing Origin header is allowed, so non-browser clients (curl/Burp) are not blocked.
Path:
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py
Function:
cmd_serve (argparse)
Snippet:
parser.add_argument("--api-key", default=None) # unauthenticated by default
Path:
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.py
Function:
_handle_tools_call
Snippet:
result = await tool.handler(**arguments) # arguments forwarded without inputSchema validation
Issue: attacker-controlled arguments are passed straight to the handler; the dispatcher does not validate them against the tool's advertised inputSchema. The only thing rejecting undeclared keys is the handler's own Python signature.
praisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream (no --api-key).initialize → session; tools/list → enumerates ~50 tools; tools/call → arguments pass through unvalidated.Auth is opt-in (only added when an api key is set); missing Origin is allowed; the dispatcher does not enforce inputSchema.
Unauthenticated access to the MCP tool surface. Default bind 127.0.0.1 (any local process / multi-user host; remote only if --host 0.0.0.0).
praisonai.workflow.run / workflow.run_file are runtime-refuted in 4.6.63: the adapter calls AgentsGenerator(...) missing the required config_list argument → errors before any execution/file open. Several other tool adapters also error at runtime. No unauthenticated RCE/arbitrary-file-open via these tools at HEAD.knowledge.add file read is broken (see FT-01_Knowledge_FileRead_Negative_Report.md).Real MCP HTTP-stream server (api_key=None) in a local runtime (127.0.0.1:18090). Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\ (docker-compose.mcp.yml). MCP requests use Accept: application/json + header Mcp-Session-Id.
MCP-Initialize: POST /mcp initialize (no Authorization) → 200 + mcp-session-id.MCP-Tools-List-NoAuth: POST /mcp tools/list with that session id → 200 + ~50 tools.MCP-Schema-Bypass: tools/call with an undeclared extra argument (__undeclared_evil_param__).The transport requires authentication; the dispatcher validates arguments against inputSchema.
initialize/tools/list succeed with no auth and no Origin header.got an unexpected keyword argument '__undeclared_evil_param__'), proving no schema validation at the dispatcher.Unauthenticated MCP initialize
A POST request to /mcp with method initialize succeeds without an Authorization header. The server returns HTTP 200 OK, exposes MCP capabilities, and issues an mcp-session-id to the unauthenticated client.
Unauthenticated MCP tools/list
After initialization, the same unauthenticated MCP session can call tools/list using only the issued Mcp-Session-Id. The server returns HTTP 200 OK and exposes tool names, schemas, and annotations.
MCP tool-call schema bypass
The unauthenticated MCP client calls tools/call with an extra argument not declared in the tool schema. Instead of rejecting the schema-violating input at the dispatcher layer, the unexpected parameter reaches the Python handler and causes an unexpected keyword argument error. This confirms incomplete input-schema enforcement for tool calls.
Unauthenticated tool enumeration and tool-call surface; LLM-key/cost abuse and data access via whichever tools function (impact currently limited by several broken adapters and the default loopback bind). No confirmed unauthenticated RCE/file-read in 4.6.63.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T21:58:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T17:16:52Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}