In affected versions, calling UploadedFile::move() without a second argument uses the client-provided filename without sanitization. Depending on the destination path and server configuration, an attacker can supply a filename containing path traversal sequences (e.g. ../../public/shell.php) to write uploaded content outside the intended upload directory.
The patch sanitizes this default (no-argument) path.
Note: The patch only sanitizes the filename when no second argument is passed. If your application explicitly passes a client-provided name as the second argument, you remain responsible for sanitizing it - the patch does not (and cannot) sanitize a caller-supplied filename:
// Unsafe - even after upgrading:
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $file->getName());
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $file->getClientName());
Upgrade to v4.7.4 or later.
If you cannot upgrade immediately, use a generated filename or sanitize the client filename before passing it to move().
Use a generated filename:
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $file->getRandomName());
Or sanitize the client filename before passing it to move():
helper('security');
$name = sanitize_filename($file->getClientName());
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $name);
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-07T18:23:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-31T06:16:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}