Affected versions of csrf-lite are vulnerable to timing attacks as a result of testing CSRF tokens via a fail-early comparison instead of a constant-time comparison.
Timing attacks remove the exponential increase in entropy gained from increased secret length, by providing per-character feedback on the correctness of a guess via miniscule timing differences.
Under favorable network conditions, an attacker can exploit this to guess the secret in no more than (16*18)288 guesses, instead of the 16^18 guesses required were the timing attack not present.
Update to version 0.1.2 or later.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:40:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
}