The sigstore-python OAuth authentication flow is susceptible to Cross-Site Request Forgery.
_OAuthSession creates a unique "state" and sends it as a parameter in the authentication request but the "state" in the server response seems not not be cross-checked with this value.
Fix should be fairly trivial.
This should be low impact: A man-in-the middle attacker could trick a sigstore-python user into signing something with an identity controlled by the attacker (by returning the response to an authentication request they created). This would be quite confusing but not dangerous.
{
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-26T21:34:50Z",
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-26T23:16:08Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"severity": "LOW"
}