Fleet trusted client-supplied IP address headers when determining the source IP for incoming requests. This allowed authenticated and unauthenticated clients to spoof their apparent IP address and bypass per-IP rate limiting controls.
Fleet determines a client’s public IP address using HTTP headers such as:
These headers were trusted without validation. An attacker could supply arbitrary values in these headers, causing Fleet to treat each request as originating from a different IP address.
This could allow an attacker to bypass per-IP rate limits and increase the effectiveness of brute-force or password-spraying attempts against authentication endpoints.
This issue does not allow authentication bypass, privilege escalation, data exposure, or remote code execution on its own.
Run Fleet behind a trusted reverse proxy or load balancer that overwrites client IP headers.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Email us at security@fleetdm.com Join #fleet in osquery Slack
We thank @fuzzztf for responsibly reporting this issue.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T13:13:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T20:17:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}