The fix for AIKIDO-2024-10565 (plaintext password logging) introduced two
redaction helpers — DriverUtil.toStringWithoutSensitiveValues() and
DriverUtil.redactSensitiveValuesInJdbcUrl() — but both helpers only redact
the "password" property/parameter (JdbcUrlUtil.TAG_PASSWORD). The equally
sensitive "token" property (JdbcUrlUtil.TAG_TOKEN), used for DataStax
Astra and other token-based Cassandra authentication, is completely unredacted
by both helpers. Applications using token-based authentication with DEBUG
logging enabled will therefore log the live authentication token in plaintext
via SessionHolder's calls to these same two helpers — the exact same
exposure pattern that the original fix was intended to prevent.
File: src/main/java/com/ing/data/cassandra/jdbc/utils/DriverUtil.java
// toStringWithoutSensitiveValues (lines 341-347) -- only redacts "password"
public static String toStringWithoutSensitiveValues(final Properties properties) {
final Properties withRedactedSensitiveValues = (Properties) properties.clone();
if (withRedactedSensitiveValues.containsKey(TAG_PASSWORD)) {
withRedactedSensitiveValues.setProperty(TAG_PASSWORD, "***");
}
return withRedactedSensitiveValues.toString();
}
// redactSensitiveValuesInJdbcUrl (lines 355-378) -- only redacts "password"
final String redactedQuery = Arrays.stream(...)
.map(param -> {
if (param.startsWith(TAG_PASSWORD + "=")) {
return TAG_PASSWORD + "=***";
}
return param; // <-- "token=..." passes through unmodified
})
...
JdbcUrlUtil.java defines TAG_TOKEN = "token" (line 407) as a separate,
distinct connection property used when connecting with DataStax Astra-style
token-based authentication. Neither redaction helper checks for this key.
File: src/main/java/com/ing/data/cassandra/jdbc/SessionHolder.java
Both helpers are called on connection-level properties at DEBUG log level:
// Line 150 — logs all connection properties including "token" unredacted
log.debug("Final Properties to Connection: {}",
toStringWithoutSensitiveValues(this.properties));
// Lines 173, 190 — logs JDBC URL including "?token=..." unredacted
final String jdbcUrl = redactSensitiveValuesInJdbcUrl(this.cacheKey.get(URL_KEY));
log.debug("Released last reference to {}, closing Session.", jdbcUrl);
log.debug("Acquired reference to {}, new count = {}.", jdbcUrl, ref + 1);
DEBUG logging is commonly enabled in production troubleshooting and staging environments, meaning the token is logged in plain text every time a connection is acquired or released in such environments.
Environment: JDK 17+, Maven 3.x
pom.xml dependency:
<dependency>
<groupId>com.ing.data</groupId>
<artifactId>cassandra-jdbc-wrapper</artifactId>
<version>5.0.1</version>
</dependency>
Exploit.java:
import com.ing.data.cassandra.jdbc.utils.DriverUtil;
import java.util.Properties;
public class Exploit {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
String secretToken = "AstraCS:SUPER_SECRET_TOKEN_VALUE_1234567890";
// Test 1: redactSensitiveValuesInJdbcUrl()
String urlWithToken = "jdbc:cassandra://host:9042/ks?token=" + secretToken;
String redacted = DriverUtil.redactSensitiveValuesInJdbcUrl(urlWithToken);
System.out.println("Token in 'redacted' URL: " + redacted.contains(secretToken)); // true
// Test 2: toStringWithoutSensitiveValues()
Properties props = new Properties();
props.setProperty("token", secretToken);
String redactedProps = DriverUtil.toStringWithoutSensitiveValues(props);
System.out.println("Token in 'redacted' props: " + redactedProps.contains(secretToken)); // true
// Control: password IS correctly redacted
Properties propsWithPassword = new Properties();
propsWithPassword.setProperty("password", "secret");
System.out.println("Password redacted: " +
!DriverUtil.toStringWithoutSensitiveValues(propsWithPassword).contains("secret")); // true
}
}
Result (confirmed, 3/3 reproductions on cassandra-jdbc-wrapper 5.0.1, the latest release):
Token in 'redacted' URL: true <- token leaks through the URL redactor
Token in 'redacted' props: true <- token leaks through the property redactor
Password redacted: true <- password IS correctly masked (control)
The "redacted" output for a token-based connection string is byte-for-byte
identical to the unredacted original — the helpers have no effect on token.
Vulnerability type: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File (CWE-532).
An authentication token (functionally equivalent in sensitivity to a password — it grants full access to the Cassandra cluster) is written in plaintext to application log files whenever:
An attacker who can read log files — via log aggregation system access, misconfigured log storage, or a separate log-reading vulnerability — can extract a live authentication token and use it to authenticate directly to the Cassandra cluster, accessing all data the token is authorized to read or write.
This is exactly the same impact class as the original AIKIDO-2024-10565 fix was intended to prevent — the fix simply missed a second sensitive credential type that was already present in the codebase.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-532"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T00:50:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T20:19:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}