Before OpenClaw 2026.4.2, several shared-secret comparison call sites still used early length-mismatch checks instead of the shared fixed-length comparison helper. Those paths could leak secret-length information through measurable timing differences.
The affected paths exposed a low-severity timing side channel on secret comparison. The issue did not by itself demonstrate auth bypass, but it weakened the intended constant-time handling for shared secrets.
openclaw (npm)<= 2026.4.1>= 2026.4.22026.4.1be10ecef770a4654519869c3641bbb91087c8c7b — reuse the shared secret comparison helper at affected call sitesThe fix is present on main and is staged for OpenClaw 2026.4.2. Publish this advisory after the 2026.4.2 npm release is live.
Thanks @kexinoh of Tencent zhuque Lab (https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard) for reporting.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T18:16:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-28T19:37:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}