This issue is a browser-origin WebSocket auth chain on local loopback deployments using password auth. It is serious, but conditional: an attacker must get the user to open a malicious page and then successfully guess the gateway password.
OpenClaw’s web/gateway surface is designed for local use and trusted-operator workflows. In affected versions, a browser-origin client could combine three behaviors:
Successful exploitation requires all of the following:
If the password is guessed, an attacker can establish an authenticated operator WebSocket session and invoke control-plane methods available to that role. This is not an unauthenticated internet-exposed RCE class issue by itself; it is a local browser-origin auth-hardening gap with meaningful impact under the conditions above.
openclaw (npm)<=2026.2.24 (latest published npm version as of February 26, 2026)>=2026.2.25c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffae4cb071fdbpatched_versions is pre-set to the planned next npm release (2026.2.25) so once that release is published, the advisory is published.
OpenClaw thanks @luz-oasis for reporting.
{
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:18:09Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-307",
"CWE-346"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:37Z"
}