A cookie tossing / cookie injection issue (CWE-1275). ThreadSafeCookieStore stored a cookie under the value of its Domain attribute without verifying that the responding host is allowed to set a cookie for that domain (RFC 6265 ยง5.3 step 6). A host the client connects to can therefore plant a cookie scoped to an unrelated domain, and the client will then send that cookie on later requests to that domain.
Applications that use a single AsyncHttpClient instance - and thus the default, shared CookieStore - to reach both an attacker-influenced host and a trusted host. Typical exposure: crawlers, link-preview / webhook fetchers, SSRF-style "fetch this URL" features, multi-backend aggregators, or following redirects to an attacker-controlled host. The attacker can write a cookie the client presents to the victim host (session fixation, overwriting a session id / CSRF-token cookie); they cannot read the victim host's cookies. Applications that talk only to a fixed trusted backend, or that disable/scope the cookie store, are not exposed.
Fixed in 3.0.11 and 2.16.0
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1275"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-26T14:35:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T20:17:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}