Users with read access to the password
field in directus_users
can extract the argon2 password hashes by brute forcing the export functionality combined with a _starts_with
filter. This allows the user to enumerate the password hashes.
The problem has been patched by preventing any hashed/concealed field to be filtered against with the _starts_with
or other string operator.
Ensuring that no user has read
access to the password
field in directus_users
is sufficient to prevent this vulnerability.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open a Discussion in directus/directus * Email us at security@directus.io
{ "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-07T19:15:00Z", "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-08T17:13:05Z", "github_reviewed": true, "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-200" ], "severity": "MODERATE" }