Users with read access to the password field in directus_users can extract the argon2 password hashes by brute forcing the export functionality combined with a _starts_with filter. This allows the user to enumerate the password hashes.
The problem has been patched by preventing any hashed/concealed field to be filtered against with the _starts_with or other string operator.
Ensuring that no user has read access to the password field in directus_users is sufficient to prevent this vulnerability.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open a Discussion in directus/directus * Email us at security@directus.io
{
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-08T17:13:05Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-07T19:15:00Z",
"github_reviewed": true
}