The tj-actions/changed-files workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.
The <code>changed-files</code> action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an escape_json input enabled by default, only escapes " for JSON values.
This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ; and ` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN if triggered on other events than pull_request. For example on push.
$(whoami).txt which is a valid filename.List all changed files step below.
- name: List all changed files
run: |
for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
Example output:
##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do
for file in $(whoami).txt; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
##[endgroup]
runner.txt was changed
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
A new safe_output input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.
A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
- name: List all changed files
env:
ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}
run: |
for file in "$ALL_CHANGED_FILES"; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
{
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-27T17:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-02T16:41:27Z",
"github_reviewed": true,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-77"
]
}