A high-severity integrity bypass vulnerability existed in Striae's digital confirmation workflow prior to v3.0.0. Hash-only validation trusted manifest hash fields that could be modified together with package content, allowing tampered confirmation packages to pass integrity checks.
Confirmation package integrity could be bypassed because both content and hash values were mutable in the same trust boundary. An attacker with access to an exported package could alter confirmation data and recompute hashes so hash-only checks still passed.
This affects users relying on digital confirmations as an immutability and forensic chain-of-custody control.
Patched in v3.0.0.
Upgrade to:
v3.0.0 or laterSecurity behavior added in v3.0.0:
There is no full cryptographic workaround equivalent to upgrading.
Temporary mitigations:
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327",
"CWE-353",
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T14:55:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-11T17:16:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}