GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj

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Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj/GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj
Aliases
Published
2026-11-19T20:41:18Z
Modified
2026-11-19T21:00:03Z
Severity
  • 8.8 (High) CVSS_V4 - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
obsidian-sync-mcp: Missing Host/Origin validation lets a public website drive a victim's Obsidian vault via DNS rebinding (no-auth mode)
Details

When obsidian-sync-mcp runs without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN (the documented no-auth mode for local use), the HTTP MCP endpoint does not validate the Host or Origin header before dispatching MCP methods (CWE-350). The no-auth mode's "local network only" assumption therefore does not hold: a malicious web page the operator visits can use DNS rebinding to resolve an attacker-controlled hostname to 127.0.0.1 (or the operator's LAN/VPN/Docker-published address) and issue requests the server accepts as trusted local calls, reaching the full tool surface (read_note, write_note, edit_note, delete_note, move_note, list_notes, list_folders, list_tags, get_note_metadata).

Affected versions: <= 0.5.6 Patched version: 0.5.7

Impact

Any deployment running without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN — including the README "Filesystem mode (simplest)" quickstart and the self-hosted docker-compose setup (where MCP_AUTH_TOKEN defaults to empty)" — is exposed to any website the operator visits while the server is running. That page's JavaScript can silently read the entire vault and create/overwrite/delete/move notes, with no credentials and no prompt. In CouchDB/Self-hosted LiveSync mode, the same code path applies, so vault content in CouchDB is equally reachable. Deployments that set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN are not affected — a bearer token is not attached by browsers, so a forged request returns HTTP 401.

Remediation

Upgrade to 0.5.7, which validates both the Host and Origin headers in no-auth mode: any request whose Host is not localhost/127.0.0.1/::1 (or a value in the new MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS), or that carries a cross-origin Origin not in that allowlist, is rejected before any MCP method runs. The Host check defeats DNS rebinding; the Origin check defeats the related bypass where a page directly fetches http://127.0.0.1:/mcp (genuine loopback Host, attacker Origin) — the transport's wildcard CORS would otherwise expose the response. Non-browser MCP clients send no Origin, so they are unaffected. These checks block browser-delivered attacks only; a direct non-browser network client can still forge both headers, so on untrusted networks set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN.

Workaround (any version): set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN to require authentication — this closes the path immediately.

Technical detail

In no-auth mode serverOptions.authenticate was never installed, so FastMCP dispatched every request with no per-request check. Even with a token, only the Authorization header was inspected — nothing in the server, fastmcp, or mcp-proxy validated Host/Origin. Two browser-reachable variants follow: (1) classic DNS rebinding, where the browser sends the attacker's hostname in Host; and (2) a direct cross-origin fetch() to the loopback address, where Host is genuinely 127.0.0.1 but Origin is attacker-controlled and the transport's wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * exposes the response — no rebinding required. The 0.5.7 fix adds an application-layer Host+Origin check in authenticate that rejects such requests before dispatch; it is a compensating control and does not alter the wildcard CORS header itself (the rejection happens before any response body is produced).

Proof of concept (mitigated in 0.5.7)

# No-auth server (per the README quickstart)
VAULT_PATH=/tmp/demo-vault HOST=127.0.0.1 PORT=8787 npx tsx src/main.ts

# Forged Host/Origin (what a DNS-rebinding page's fetch() sends) reaches the tools with no credential:
curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \
  -H "Host: attacker.example" -H "Origin: http://attacker.example" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"1.0"}}}'
# -> HTTP 200; a follow-up tools/call to write_note creates a file in the vault, no Authorization header.
# The same sequence against a server with MCP_AUTH_TOKEN set returns HTTP 401.
# Variant 2 — no rebinding needed: real loopback Host, attacker Origin.
# In <= 0.5.6 this returns 200 and executes tools; in 0.5.7 it returns 403.
curl -s -i http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp \
  -H "Host: 127.0.0.1:8787" -H "Origin: http://attacker.example" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"1.0"}}}'
Database specific
{
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-350"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T20:41:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T23:17:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
}
References

Affected packages

npm / obsidian-sync-mcp

Package

Name
obsidian-sync-mcp
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:npm/obsidian-sync-mcp

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
0.5.7

Database specific

last_known_affected_version_range
"<= 0.5.6"
source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj/GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj.json"