shell-env fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for $SHELL, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios.
In affected versions, shell selection accepted either:
/etc/shells, or/bin, /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, /opt/homebrew/bin, /run/current-system/sw/bin).The selected shell was then executed as a login shell (-l -c 'env -0') for PATH/environment probing.
On systems where a trusted-prefix directory is writable (for example common Homebrew layouts under /opt/homebrew/bin) and runtime $SHELL can be influenced, this enabled attacker-controlled binary execution in OpenClaw process context.
The fix removes the trusted-prefix executable fallback and now trusts only shells explicitly registered in /etc/shells; otherwise it falls back to /bin/sh.
openclaw (npm)>= 2026.2.22, <= 2026.2.22-22026.2.22-2>= 2026.2.23ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55This advisory sets patched_versions to the released version (2026.2.23).
This advisory now reflects released fix version 2026.2.23.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-184",
"CWE-829"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:36:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T02:16:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
}