Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? returns true for a javascript: or vbscript: URI whose scheme is split by a numeric character reference without a trailing semicolon, followed by a character that allowed_uri? strips, such as a space or tab. A browser ends the reference at that character and reads javascript: alert(1) as javascript: alert(1).
allowed_uri? strips control characters and whitespace before it decodes numeric character references. Removing the character that ends a semicolon-less reference lets the reference run on into the following text, so : alert decodes as Ϊ (U+03AA) instead of a colon, and no scheme is detected. The same applies to decimal references and to references that encode a scheme letter, as in j\tavascript:alert(1).
Loofah's default sanitize() path is not affected, because Nokogiri decodes the entity during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI. This issue affects only callers of the public allowed_uri? string-level helper that pass it HTML-encoded strings.
Applications that validate a user-controlled URL with Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? and then render the approved value into an href or another browser-interpreted URI attribute may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting. Rails::HTML::Sanitizer.allowed_uri? re-exports the same helper.
Upgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.3.
Responsibly reported by GitHub user @manus-pi.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-184",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T21:26:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
}