A command injection vulnerability existed in Windows Scheduled Task script generation for OpenClaw. Environment values were written into gateway.cmd using unquoted set KEY=VALUE, which allowed Windows shell metacharacters in config-provided environment variables to break out of assignment context.
openclaw (npm)<= 2026.2.17>= 2026.2.192026.2.17For a single-user, localhost-only setup on a personally controlled machine, practical risk is typically low.
This issue becomes materially relevant when configuration or environment values are sourced from less-trusted inputs, for example:
gateway install/reinstall.In those scenarios, it provides a reliable config-to-command-execution path when the scheduled task script is generated and run.
On Windows, gateway service installation writes a helper batch script and then registers it via Scheduled Task (schtasks).
Before the fix, env lines were rendered as set KEY=VALUE in src/daemon/schtasks.ts, so values containing metacharacters (for example &, |, ^, %, !) could alter command behavior in cmd.exe.
The fix now renders quoted assignments (set "KEY=VALUE") with explicit escaping for cmd metacharacters, updates parser compatibility for quoted assignments, and adds regression tests for metacharacter handling and round-trip parsing.
dafe52e8cf1a041d898cfb304a485fa05e5f58fbOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:50:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
}