An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory sending a large number of PATHCHALLENGE frames. The receiver is supposed to respond to each PATHCHALLENGE frame with a PATHRESPONSE frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these PATHRESPONSE frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate.
I published a more detailed description of the attack and its mitigation in this blog post: https://seemann.io/posts/2023-12-18-exploiting-quics-path-validation/
There's no way to mitigate this attack, please update quic-go to a version that contains the fix.
{ "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-10T22:15:50Z", "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-400" ], "severity": "MODERATE", "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-10T15:08:40Z" }