GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p

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Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p
Aliases
  • CVE-2026-96627
Published
2026-10-16T21:15:03Z
Modified
2026-10-16T21:30:04Z
Severity
  • 8.8 (High) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H CVSS Calculator
Summary
Arcane: Delegated users:update permission allows admin account takeover via password reset (no privilege-hierarchy check)
Details

Summary

A user holding the delegated users:update permission can reset the global administrator's password and take over the admin account. UpdateUser sets the target user's PasswordHash from the request body for ANY target with no comparison of caller-vs-target privilege. Because role assignment and role CRUD are deliberately gated by RequireGlobalAdmin, users:update is intended to sit BELOW admin (profile management); this finding defeats that separation.

Root Cause

UpdateUser (handler backend/api/handlers/users.go:317-323) loads the target by ID and sets userModel.PasswordHash from the request body for any user, then userService.UpdateUser (user_service.go:174) simply tx.Saves — with NO actor-vs-target privilege comparison. The only IsGlobalAdmin guard (user_service.go:345) is a last-admin check inside DeleteUser, not the update path. Role assignment / role CRUD are RequireGlobalAdmin (backend/pkg/authz/permissions.go:27-33), proving users:update is intended below admin.

Impact

Complete administrator account takeover (C:H/I:H/A:H) by any holder of the delegated users:update permission.

Proof of Concept

  1. Admin delegates a custom "User Manager" role with users:update.
  2. PUT /users/{adminId} with {"password":"attacker123"}.
  3. POST /auth/login {"username":"arcane","password":"attacker123"} → admin session.

Attack Chain

  1. Action: admin delegates custom role with users:update. Guard: role creation is RequireGlobalAdmin. Bypass: intended delegation (holder is meant to manage profiles, not seize admin).
  2. Action: PUT /users/{adminId} {"password":"attacker123"}. Guard: RequirePermission(users:update) (users.go:154). Bypass: holder has it; no hierarchy check (users.go:317-323, user_service.go:174 unconditional Save).
  3. Action: POST /auth/login as admin → admin session.

Bypass Evidence

  • users.go:317-323 sets PasswordHash for any target; user_service.go:174-194 has no actor/target privilege comparison.
  • Only IsGlobalAdmin hits are DeleteUser's last-admin guard and DTO flags (grep).
  • users:update is org-level, held by no built-in non-admin role (permissions.go:24).

Affected Versions

<= 2.5.0.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Database specific
{
    "cwe_ids":  [
        "CWE-266",
        "CWE-269"
    ],
    "github_reviewed":  true,
    "github_reviewed_at":  "2026-10-16T21:15:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at":  null,
    "severity":  "HIGH"
}
References

Affected packages

Go / github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2

Package

Name
github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:golang/github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
2.6.0

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p/GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p.json"