GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f

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Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f
Aliases
Published
2026-11-19T22:25:53Z
Modified
2026-11-19T22:45:07Z
Severity
  • 8.2 (High) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table
Details

Summary

In read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through execute_query, and SQL injection through describe_table.

Details

  • Statement chaining in execute_query. The only check was that the query starts with SELECT. The modernc.org/sqlite driver runs every ;-separated statement in one call, so anything after SELECT 1; ran unchecked.
  • SQL injection in describe_table. The table_name argument was interpolated into PRAGMA table_info(%s) with no guard.
  • Escaping read-only mode. Through either path, ATTACH DATABASE opens a file read-write regardless of the main connection's mode=ro. Attaching the protected database itself made it writable. Attaching another path read that file, or created it if it did not exist.

Read-write mode is not affected beyond its intended capabilities, apart from ATTACH reaching files other than the configured database.

Impact

  • Modify the database that read-only mode is meant to protect.
  • Read any SQLite database file the server process can read.
  • Create new SQLite-format files anywhere the server process can write, or write to existing SQLite or empty files. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged.

The server has no built-in authentication and, by default, listens on :8080 on all interfaces. Unless it is deployed behind an authenticating proxy, anyone who can reach that port can exploit this.

Patches

Fixed in v0.1.2:

  • ATTACH is disabled in the engine (SQLITE_LIMIT_ATTACHED set to 0) on every connection that runs a statement.
  • Read-only connections set query_only.
  • execute_query rejects input that contains more than one statement.
  • describe_table passes the table name as a bound parameter.

Workarounds

Upgrade to v0.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, don't expose the server to untrusted clients: keep it on a loopback or private interface, or run it behind an authenticating proxy such as ToolHive. Mount only the database you intend to expose, read-only at the filesystem or container level.

Credits

Reported by @bebold6133.

Database specific
{
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-863",
        "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T22:25:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T17:17:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
}
References

Affected packages

Go / github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp

Package

Name
github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:golang/github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0 Unknown introduced version / All previous versions are affected
Fixed
0.1.2

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f.json"