Unarchive in pkg/utils/zip.go joined each archive entry name with the destination directory via filepath.Join and wrote the result without checking whether the resolved path stayed under the destination. A zip entry named
../../tmp/evil therefore landed at /tmp/evil. An attacker who could control a Package.Spec.Source.URL or Deployment.URL archive could induce the fetcher (running as the per-environment pod's fission-fetcher sidecar) to write
files anywhere that process could reach: into other tenants' /packages/<ns>/ directories, into mounted secret/config volumes, or into the fetcher's own binary.
github.com/fission/fission647c141pkg/utils/zip.go (Unarchive)Fix section (paste into the Fix / Patches field)
Fixed in v1.25.0 by:
55704aca) — Unarchive now opens an os.Root on the destination, validates each
archive entry name (rejects absolute paths and .. traversal), and refuses symlink entries up front. The os.Root confines every mkdir / create to the destination in the kernel.Regression coverage: TestUnarchiveZipSlip in pkg/utils/zip_test.go exercises parent-traversal, absolute-path, and symlink entries.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T20:16:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T18:17:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}