GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf

Suggest an improvement
Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf/GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf
Published
2026-05-08T17:31:07Z
Modified
2026-05-08T17:49:17Z
Severity
  • 5.1 (Medium) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
`potato-annotation` has a Project-Boundary Bypass
Details

Summary

validate_path_security uses string-prefix containment (startswith) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are outside the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... vs /tmp/potato_proj_demo) to be accepted.

Details

Affected source location (root cause)

File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py

Snippet (lines 370–373):

real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_base):
    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)

Snippet (lines 384–389):

real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
check_dir = project_dir if project_dir else base_dir
real_check_dir = os.path.realpath(check_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_check_dir):
    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)

startswith() is string-based, so /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... passes when checked against /tmp/potato_proj_demo.

Confirmed affected call sites

File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py

  1. validate_file_paths task_dir branch (line 2113)
validated_task_dir = validate_path_security(task_dir, project_dir)
  1. validate_file_paths data_files branch (line 2151)
validated_path = validate_path_security(file_path, base_dir, project_dir)
  1. validate_training_config training.data_file branch (line 2286)
validated_path = validate_path_security(data_file, base_dir, project_dir)

PoC

from potato.server_utils.config_module import validate_path_security

base = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo'
vuln = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/file.txt'

try:
    print('inside=', validate_path_security('/tmp/potato_proj_demo/file.txt', base, base))
except Exception as e:
    print('inside_error=', type(e).__name__, e)

try:
    validate_path_security('/tmp/other_demo/file.txt', base, base)
except Exception as e:
    print('baseline=', type(e).__name__, e)

print('trigger=', validate_path_security(vuln, base, base))

Impact

  • Can allow unauthorized sibling-prefix file access outside intended project boundary.
  • Can affect read paths (data_files, training.data_file, base_css, header_logo) and output/path placement depending on configuration.
Database specific
{
    "cwe_ids":  [
        "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed":  true,
    "github_reviewed_at":  "2026-05-08T17:31:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at":  null,
    "severity":  "MODERATE"
}
References

Affected packages

PyPI / potato-annotation

Package

Name
potato-annotation
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:pypi/potato-annotation

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
2.0.0
Fixed
2.4.5

Affected versions

2.*
2.0.0
2.0.1
2.0.2
2.1.0
2.2.0
2.3.0
2.4.0
2.4.1
2.4.3
2.4.4

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf/GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf.json"