On Windows nodes, exec requests were executed via cmd.exe /d /s /c <rawCommand>. In allowlist/approval-gated mode, the allowlist analysis did not model Windows cmd.exe parsing and metacharacter behavior. A crafted command string could cause cmd.exe to interpret additional operations (for example command chaining via &, or expansion via %...% / !...!) beyond what was allowlisted/approved.
openclaw (npm)<= 2026.2.1>= 2026.2.22026.2.13cmd.exe via src/infra/node-shell.ts.cmd.exe invocation as not allowlist-safe on Windows.cmd.exe entirely in allowlist mode by executing the parsed argv directly when possible.a7f4a53ce80c98ba1452eb90802d447fca9bf3d6Thanks @simecek for reporting.
{
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:15Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T16:44:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}