The password reset mechanism of the Directus backend is implemented in a way where combined with (specific, need to double check if i can work around) configuration in MySQL or MariaDB. As such, it allows attackers to receive a password reset email of a victim user, specifically having it arrive at a similar email address as the victim with a one or more characters changed to use accents.
This is due to the fact that by default MySQL/MariaDB are configured for accent-insenstive and case-insensitve comparisons.
MySQL weak comparison:
select 1 from directus_users where 'julian@cure53.de' = 'julian@cüre53.de';
This is exploitable due to an error in the API using the supplied email address for sending the reset password mail instead of using the email from the database.
julian@cure53.de. (possibly just the domain could be enough for an educated guess)cüre53.de can be registered to be able to receive emails.julian@cüre53.de.POST /auth/password/request HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
[...]
{"email":"julian@cüre53.de"}
julian@cure53.de and will continue to email the password reset link to the provided email address instead of the saved email address.Should be possible with collations but haven't been able to confirm this.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-706"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-01T16:58:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-01T16:15:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}