GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536

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Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536
Aliases
  • CVE-2026-25960
Published
2026-03-09T19:55:32Z
Modified
2026-03-10T18:47:18.743987Z
Severity
  • 5.4 (Medium) CVSS_V3 - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L CVSS Calculator
Summary
vLLM has SSRF Protection Bypass
Details

Summary

The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the load_from_url_async method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client.

Affected Component

  • File: vllm/connections.py
  • Function: load_from_url_async

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The SSRF fix uses urllib3.util.parse_url() to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, load_from_url_async uses aiohttp for making the actual HTTP requests, and aiohttp internally uses the yarl library for URL parsing.

These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (\) differently:

| Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior | |--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------| | urllib3.parse_url() | https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/ | httpbin.org | /%5C@evil.com/ | URL-encodes \ as %5C, treats \@evil.com/ as part of the path | | yarl (via aiohttp) | https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/ | evil.com | / | Treats \ as part of userinfo (user: httpbin.org\), the @ acts as the userinfo/host separator |

Attack Scenario

# Attacker provides this URL
malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/"

# 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url)
parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url)
# parsed.host == "httpbin.org"  ✅ Passes validation

# 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl)
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
    async with session.get(malicious_url) as response:
        # Request actually goes to evil.com!  ❌ Bypass!

Why This Happens

  1. yarl: Interprets httpbin.org\ as the userinfo component, and @ as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed as user=httpbin.org\, host=evil.com, path=/
  2. urllib3: URL-encodes the backslash as %5C, so \@evil.com/ becomes /%5C@evil.com/ which is treated as part of the path, leaving host=httpbin.org

This inconsistency allows an attacker to: - Bypass the hostname allowlist check - Access arbitrary internal/external services - Perform full SSRF attacks

Fixes

  • https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743
Database specific
{
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-09T19:55:32Z",
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-09T21:16:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
}
References

Affected packages

PyPI / vllm

Package

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0.15.1
Fixed
0.17.0

Affected versions

0.*
0.15.1
0.16.0

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536.json"