An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in @angular/ssr due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., ///), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (\) bypass.
When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header:
\evil.com).Location header containing /\evil.com./\ sequence as //, treating it as a protocol-relative URL and redirecting the user to the attacker-controlled domain.Furthermore, the response lacks the Vary: X-Forwarded-Prefix header, allowing the malicious redirect to be stored in intermediate caches (Web Cache Poisoning).
This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:
Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in their server.ts before the Angular engine processes the request:
app.use((req, res, next) => {
const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'];
if (typeof prefix === 'string') {
// Sanitize by removing all leading forward and backward slashes
req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.trim().replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
}
next();
});
{
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T15:16:38Z",
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T21:22:52Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"severity": "MODERATE",
"github_reviewed": true
}