The WebSocket upgrade handler in the server validates authentication (API key token or session cookie) but does not check the Origin header. A malicious webpage on a different origin could initiate a WebSocket connection to ws://localhost:3000/ws if it can leverage the user's session cookie (which is SameSite=Lax, allowing top-level navigations).
This enables cross-origin WebSocket hijacking — if a user visits a malicious site while a Grackle session is active, the attacker's page could open a WebSocket and subscribe to real-time events (session output, task updates, environment state).
Affected code:
packages/server/src/ws-bridge.ts:80-91 — connection handler accepts WebSocket upgrades without checking req.headers.originFix: Validate req.headers.origin against an allowlist before accepting connections:
const origin = req.headers.origin || "";
if (origin && !origin.includes("localhost") && !origin.includes("127.0.0.1")) {
ws.close(4003, "Invalid origin");
return;
}
Ensure the Grackle server is only accessible on 127.0.0.1 (the default). Do not use --allow-network in untrusted network environments.
packages/server/src/ws-bridge.ts{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T17:27:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
}