nettyunixsocketrecvFd sets msgcontrol to char control[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] (line 940) — 24 bytes on 64-bit Linux. A peer-sent SCMRIGHTS cmsg carrying two ints has cmsglen = CMSGLEN(8) = 24, which fits exactly with no MSGCTRUNC, so the kernel installs both fds in the receiving process. The subsequent check cmsg->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)) (line 972, expected 20) fails, the branch that would read the fd is skipped, and neither installed fd is closed. The for(;;) loop calls recvmsg again (non-blocking → EAGAIN → Java maps to 0 → read loop exits normally), leaving two leaked fds per message. There is no MSGCTRUNC handling. Reachable via Epoll/KQueue DomainSocketChannel when the application opts into DomainSocketReadMode.FILEDESCRIPTORS (non-default).
{
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T23:01:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-772"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"nvd_published_at": null
}