RustFS does not validate policy conditions in presigned POST uploads (PostObject), allowing attackers to bypass content-length-range, starts-with, and Content-Type constraints. This enables unauthorized file uploads exceeding size limits, uploads to arbitrary object keys, and content-type spoofing, potentially leading to storage exhaustion, unauthorized data access, and security bypasses.
When generating presigned POST URLs via the AWS SDK, applications can specify policy conditions to restrict uploads. RustFS accepts these presigned requests but fails to validate the following conditions server-side:
content-length-range not enforced: The server does not verify that the uploaded file size falls within the specified minimum and maximum bounds. An attacker can upload arbitrarily large files despite restrictions.starts-with not enforced: The server does not validate that the object key matches the required prefix. An attacker can modify the key field to upload files to any path in the bucket.Content-Type (exact match) not enforced: The server does not verify that the uploaded file's content type matches the policy constraint. An attacker can upload files with any content type.The vulnerability exists in the PostObject endpoint implementation, where the signed policy conditions are not parsed and validated against the actual upload request.
Vulnerability Type: Improper Input Validation / Authorization Bypass
Any application using RustFS as an S3-compatible backend that relies on presigned POST policy conditions for access control or upload restrictions.
Severity: The vulnerability allows complete bypass of server-enforced upload policies, undermining the security model that applications rely upon.
{
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T03:16:04Z",
"github_reviewed": true,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T22:38:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}