bin/fzf-tmux fails to validate layout size values given in the attached form (e.g. -l50). For -l/-u these values reach bash arithmetic expansion ($(( max - size ))), where an operand like a[$(cmd)] executes cmd as the invoking user during option parsing — before any tmux interaction and even outside tmux. A second sink embeds unvalidated popup geometry (-x/-y/-w/-h/-p) into an unquoted tmux popup ... $opt ... invocation, allowing injection of tmux flags such as -e BASH_ENV=<path> (command execution via non-interactive bash sourcing $BASH_ENV).
Sai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/
In bin/fzf-tmux (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb), the option parser validates size values with a regex (^[0-9%,]+$ / ^[A-Z]$) only for the separate-argument form (line 82). The attached form is captured unvalidated at line 80:
if [[ ${#arg} -gt 2 ]]; then
size="${arg:2}" # no validation
else
if [[ $1 =~ ^[0-9%,]+$ ]] || [[ $1 =~ ^[A-Z]$ ]]; then # only separate form validated
For -l and -u, swap is non-empty (lines 68/75), so size reaches arithmetic evaluation:
size=$((max - size)) (non-percent values)opt="$opt -l $((100 - size))%" (percent, tmux >= 3.2)opt="$opt -p $((100 - size))" (percent, tmux < 3.2)Bash arithmetic expands array subscripts, so a[$(command)] runs command. Verified end-to-end against the unmodified script (see PoC).
Second sink (same root cause): opt is used unquoted at line 236 (tmux popup -d "$PWD" $opt "bash $argsf") and line 249, so a geometry value containing spaces injects extra tmux flags, e.g. -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/script.
Verified on 0.74.4 (no tmux or fzf binary needed — a stub fzf on PATH suffices because the sink fires during bash argument parsing):
$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-l a[$(id > /tmp/pwn1)]' # line 120 sink (non-percent)
$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-u a[$(id > /tmp/pwn2)]%' # line 102/108 sink (percent)
$ cat /tmp/pwn1 /tmp/pwn2
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...
A self-contained reproducer was provided by email (poc-t03-arithmetic.sh). Popup flag-injection variant (tmux >= 3.2): bash bin/fzf-tmux -p '-x0 -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/evil.sh'.
Local command injection (CWE-78). fzf-tmux argv is commonly assembled by third-party scripts and editor plugins (e.g. fzf-tmux -l "${height}%"); any layout value influenced by less-trusted data (project-local config, wrapper scripts) yields arbitrary command execution as the invoking user. Suggested fixes: apply the regex validation to the attached form, constrain size to [0-9]+ before any $((...)), and build the tmux invocation as an array ("${opt_parts[@]}") instead of unquoted $opt.
Reported privately to the maintainer by email; fixes prepared for the next release.
Impact is high (command execution as the invoking user), but a real attack requires attacker-controlled data to reach the fzf-tmux layout arguments (-l/-u). In normal use these values are set by the user or by trusted, hardcoded configuration, so a vulnerable data flow is uncommon. The issue is local-only, requires the victim to run fzf-tmux with the poisoned value, and bin/fzf-tmux has been superseded by the built-in --tmux/--popup option since 0.53.0.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T22:41:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-17T20:17:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}