None of the response paths in internal/web/ or internal/api/ set the standard browser-security headers. grep for Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy returns zero matches across the codebase.
The admin UI signs CA certificates, mints API keys (returned inline once per page), displays TOTP QR codes, and exposes operator-management forms. Missing X-Frame-Options: DENY / frame-ancestors 'none' is a real clickjacking lever against an admin browsing /ui/operators/* or /ui/cas/*. Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff allows MIME confusion on any user-supplied content surface. Missing HSTS on TLS deployments leaves a downgrade window.
All released versions up to v0.3.0.
A single response-header middleware mounted at the chi router root in both /ui/* and /api/* paths:
func securityHeadersMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h := rw.Header()
h.Set("Content-Security-Policy",
"default-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'")
h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin")
h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY") // belt-and-braces; CSP frame-ancestors is the modern path
if r.TLS != nil {
h.Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains")
}
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
})
}
The inline <script> in layout.html for CSRF wiring (added in the CSRF advisory) will need either a nonce, a hash in CSP, or external-file extraction. Easiest path: a nonce per request (crypto/rand, base64) injected into both the CSP header and the script's nonce="" attribute.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1021"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T23:08:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
}