During recovery, a Coordinator only verifies that a given recovery key decrypts the sealed state, not if this key was provided by a party with access to one of the recovery keys defined in the manifest. This allows an attacker to manually craft a sealed state using their own recovery keys, and a manifest that does not match the rest of the state.
If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's Coordinator, a remote party is susceptible to impersonation if they verify the Coordinator without comparing the root certificate of the Coordinator against a trusted reference.
Under these circumstances, an attacker can trick a remote party into trusting the malicious Coordinator by presenting a manifest that does not match the actual state of the deployment.
This issue does not affect the following:
The issue has been patched in <code>v1.7.0</code>.
Connections that purely authenticate based on a known Coordinator's root certificate, e.g. the one retrieved when using the marblerun manifest set CLI command, are not affected.
{
"nvd_published_at": null,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-04T21:23:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH",
"github_reviewed": true
}