During recovery, a Coordinator only verifies that a given recovery key decrypts the sealed state, not if this key was provided by a party with access to one of the recovery keys defined in the manifest. This allows an attacker to manually craft a sealed state using their own recovery keys, and a manifest that does not match the rest of the state.
If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's Coordinator, a remote party is susceptible to impersonation if they verify the Coordinator without comparing the root certificate of the Coordinator against a trusted reference.
Under these circumstances, an attacker can trick a remote party into trusting the malicious Coordinator by presenting a manifest that does not match the actual state of the deployment.
This issue does not affect the following:
The issue has been patched in v1.7.0
.
Connections that purely authenticate based on a known Coordinator's root certificate, e.g. the one retrieved when using the marblerun manifest set
CLI command, are not affected.
{ "nvd_published_at": null, "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-285" ], "severity": "HIGH", "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-04T21:23:48Z" }