GitPython has spent 2022-2026 rolling out two reusable guards method-by-method: Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url) (raises UnsafeProtocolError for <transport>:: remote-helper URLs - CVE-2022-24439) and Git.check_unsafe_options(...) (raises UnsafeOptionError for denylisted option spellings - CVE-2023-40267, CVE-2026-42215, CVE-2026-67323). Three wrapper methods that build a git argv from caller-controlled values still have neither:
Git.ls_remote (git/cmd.py:1128-1143) - checks options (:1139-1141) but forwards the URL positional unchecked; no allow_unsafe_protocols parameter exists. The same URL through clone_from raises UnsafeProtocolError.Repo.merge_base (git/repo/base.py:895-936) - forwards **kwargs/*rev to self.git.merge_base with no guard; guarded sibling iter_commits sits 12 lines up. Its exception handler additionally swallows every non-128 GitCommandError into [], masking the injection.IndexFile.move (git/index/base.py:1092-1168) - forwards **kwargs to git mv twice (:1147, :1167); guarded sibling remove() is 23 lines above.Verified unfixed on main @ a54d159 (2026-09-21), post-dating latest release 3.1.62 (2026-09-07) - all three sites re-verified today.
Site 1 (ls_remote) - RCE conditional on the victim git transport policy. The common 'probe first, then clone' pattern (Git(...).ls_remote(attacker_url)) with an ext::sh -c ... URL executes arbitrary commands when the victim git permits the ext transport: dynamically verified with protocol.ext.allow=always (marker executed). git >= 2.38.1 stock config refuses the transport (fatal: transport 'ext' not allowed, rc 128) - GitPython adds no defense-in-depth and surfaces a bare GitCommandError. Environments on git < 2.38.1 are exposed with stock config - the exact population CVE-2022-24439 was scored against.
Sites 2/3 - latent argument-injection surface: caller kwargs flow 1:1 into the git argv before operands and -- (cmd.py:1850 opt_args + ext_args), and execute_kwargs (incl. shell=True/env - the CVE-2023-40267 Windows mechanism) passes through unguarded. Today git merge-base/git mv expose no exec option, so we claim the missing-guard class (vendor-settled by CVE-2026-67323, which bundled archive/ls_remote/iter_commits/blame in one advisory), not direct RCE.
| # | Call | Result |
|---|---|---|
| T1 | repo.git.ls_remote('ext::/tmp/gp_touch.sh'), stock config |
git refuses (rc 128); no UnsafeProtocolError from GitPython |
| T1b | same + victim config protocol.ext.allow=always |
marker created - arbitrary command executed |
| T2 | repo.git.ls_remote('.', upload_pack=...) |
blocked by cmd.py:1141 (options-side fixed - protocol-side is the residual gap) |
| T3 | repo.merge_base('main','side', upload_pack=...) |
not blocked; argv git merge-base --upload-pack=... main side; rc 129 silently converted to [] |
| T4 | repo.index.move(['f1','f2'], output=...) |
not blocked; option reaches git mv (rc 129) |
check_unsafe_protocols: 7 call sites (_clone, archive, set_url, create, fetch, pull, push) - none on ls_remote.
check_unsafe_options: 24 call sites incl. ls_remote, iter_commits, IndexFile.remove - absent on merge_base and move.
check_unsafe_protocols on the clone path - Site 1 is the same ext:: primitive on a sibling API.check_unsafe_options - unguarded kwargs to argv treated as RCE (shell=True on Windows).check_unsafe_options to archive/ls_remote/iter_commits/blame; its PoC is literally repo.git.ls_remote('.', upload_pack=...). Establishes that a wrapper missing the check is itself a vulnerability. This report is the residual gap of that rollout: ls_remote got options but not protocols; merge_base/move got neither.Git.ls_remote: if not allow_unsafe_protocols: self.check_unsafe_protocols(args[0]) + new allow_unsafe_protocols: bool = False (the _clone pattern, base.py:1536-1538).Repo.merge_base: check_unsafe_options(Git._option_candidates(list(rev), kwargs), unsafe_options=self.unsafe_git_revision_options) (the iter_commits pattern); stop masking non-128 statuses.IndexFile.move: the remove() pattern with unsafe_git_pathspec_from_file_options.One advisory, three affected methods, severity anchored on Site 1 - mirroring CVE-2026-67323's bundling.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-27T15:26:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
}