amqtt is vulnerable to a remote denial of service caused by incomplete MQTT QoS 2 transactions remaining allocated after the associated client disconnects.
MQTT QoS 2 uses a four-step handshake to provide exactly-once delivery. If a client begins a QoS 2 transaction but disconnects before the handshake completes, amqtt retains the associated transaction state and packet identifier without an expiration mechanism to remove it.
QoS 1 transactions are protected by a timeout mechanism, which defaults to 5 seconds, allowing abandoned state to be released. Equivalent timeout handling was not applied to incomplete QoS 2 transactions.
An attacker can repeatedly connect to the broker, initiate QoS 2 transactions, and disconnect before completing the handshake. Each incomplete transaction leaves state allocated in memory. Repeating this process causes broker memory consumption to grow continuously.
Successful exploitation can cause:
Exploitation does not require maintaining long-lived connections. An attacker can create incomplete QoS 2 transactions and disconnect, leaving the broker to retain the associated state after the network connection has closed.
Under the default configuration, anonymous clients can exploit the vulnerability without credentials. When authentication is enabled, any authenticated client permitted to initiate QoS 2 message flows may still be able to exploit it. Authentication alone is therefore not a sufficient mitigation.
pipamqtt>= 0.11.0, <= 0.12.0The vulnerable code is present in the v0.11.0 release commit, 352678c87e50e501a8a5bb91fab73c9400fa046c, and remained present on the main branch as of 5ebbf366f6b79ab12a06f426ffd18ff28954e4ea. Versions before 0.11.0 were not evaluated.
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability only. No confidentiality or integrity impact has been identified. Successful exploitation causes degradation and eventual loss of availability through memory exhaustion.
The issue will be been patched in the v0.12.1 released version; all users should upgrade.
The completed fix:
The fixing commit is 2755fd801a6f95e9b73e11116948b57a95348466
Administrators who cannot immediately upgrade should limit the ability of untrusted clients to create large numbers of incomplete QoS 2 transactions.
Where application requirements permit, preventing untrusted clients from using QoS 2 provides the strongest temporary mitigation.
Connection and request rate limiting at a reverse proxy, load balancer, firewall, or other network layer can reduce the rate at which an attacker creates abandoned transactions, but does not eliminate the underlying vulnerability. An attacker able to continue creating incomplete QoS 2 transactions can still cause memory usage to increase over time.
Administrators should also monitor broker memory consumption and configure appropriate process or container memory limits to prevent exhaustion of host resources. Restarting the broker may reclaim abandoned state and restore availability, but the broker remains vulnerable until the patched version is installed.
MQTT Keep Alive limits are not a sufficient mitigation because the vulnerable state persists after the client connection has already terminated.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-401",
"CWE-772"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-20T14:54:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T20:17:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}