This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-qhwx-74w5-xhxq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
vm2 versions >= 3.9.6 and <= 3.11.6 are affected by a NodeVM builtin allowlist bypass that permits a sandbox escape on Node.js 24 and newer when the embedder explicitly allows the node:test builtin (e.g. require: { builtin: ['node:test'] }). On Node.js 24+, module.builtinModules exposes the scheme-only key node:test, which is not covered by vm2's family-based DANGEROUS_BUILTINS protection, so it is stored in the generic host-passthrough loader. Because requireImpl() in lib/setup-node-sandbox.js strips a single 'node:' prefix before the builtin lookup, sandbox code calling require('node:node:test') resolves to the stored node:test key and receives a readonly proxy to the host module. Calls to node:test.run() are forwarded to the host implementation, which spawns a separate Node process for process-isolated test execution and passes through attacker-controlled execArgv values; supplying --eval= therefore executes arbitrary JavaScript in an unrestricted host Node process outside the NodeVM sandbox. Fixed in vm2 3.11.7.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-01T15:41:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T14:18:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
}